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Abstract 
This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments 
competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments 
strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors’ tax rates. This 
provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10% 
higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to 
raise its own rate by between 2 and 3%. This impact is robust for alternative 
specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises 
in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the 
excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced 
the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly 
been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries 
appear to compete more aggressively than low-tax countries in the sense that they 
feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large 
and small countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
European governments face an increasing international mobility of tax bases. For 
instance, differences in excise rates on beverages or cigarettes in Europe induce 
incentives for cross-border shopping (Cnossen, 2002). Similarly, corporate tax rate 
differentials are found to exert an impact on the location of foreign direct investment; 
an effect that tends to be increasing over time (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). As a 
response to this, European governments engage in a process of tax competition, i.e. 
they strategically set their tax rates in order to lure mobile factors of production or 
cross-border shoppers. Strategic tax setting means that, by reducing tax rates, 
governments aim to broaden their own tax base, thereby recovering or even raising 
fiscal revenue. Moreover, enlarging a tax base may also raise welfare of domestic 
inhabitants if it is accompanied by additional benefits, such as productivity gains.  
The theory of tax competition reveals, however, that strategic tax setting is 
typically inefficient from a European perspective.1 Indeed, independent governments 
do not take account the welfare implications of their own actions on neighboring 
countries when deciding about their own tax rates. Thus, they end up in a prisoner’s 
dilemma in which fiscal externalities cause inefficiently low levels of public goods 
supply. Tax harmonization, perhaps through minimum rates, can therefore be welfare 
improving. 
 Empirical studies on tax competition usually explore whether tax rates are 
decreasing over time in light of the increasing economic integration among countries. 
For instance, Devereux et al (2002a) show that the mean corporate tax rate in 16 
OECD countries has gradually declined between 1982 and 2001. This holds both for 
statutory rates and average effective tax rates and provides an indication that tax 
competition is indeed an important phenomenon in the OECD. 
Recently, a number of studies have tried to empirically assess the importance 
of tax competition between countries in an alternative way. In particular, these studies 
estimate so-called fiscal reaction functions. These measure the responsiveness of a 
countries’ tax rate to the rate of neighboring countries, thereby controlling for other 
determinants of the tax rate. Most of these studies focus on corporate taxation (Besley 
                                                 
1 See Wilson (1999) or Zodrow (2003) for recent reviews of the literature on tax competition. 
et al., 2001; Devereux et al., 2002b; Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002).2 They typically 
show that countries in the OECD and Europe do indeed systematically respond to 
each other’s corporate tax rates. For instance, Devereux et al. (2002b) find that 
strategic tax responses are strong and highly robust for both statutory tax rates and 
(marginal and average) effective tax rates in 16 OECD countries. For the European 
Union, Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) find similar results for alternative 
specifications for the tax game, i.e. Nash and Stackelberg. Their results suggest that a 
10%-point higher tax rate in neighboring countries implies an 8% higher rate in a 
particular European country. These findings provide evidence for the claim that 
governments aggressively compete with their corporate tax systems for foreign direct 
investment.3 In a recent study, Devereux et al. (2004) estimate fiscal reaction 
functions for US States competing for revenue from excises on cigarettes and 
gasoline. They explore both vertical tax competition between States and the federal 
government, and horizontal tax competition among States. For excises on cigarettes, 
they find that horizontal tax competition is important: a one-cent increase in the 
neighbor state excise level induces a rise in the home tax rate of 0.5 cents. For 
gasoline, they report mixed findings: the strategic interactions are not always 
statistically significant.  
 This paper empirically explores whether tax competition in Europe is also 
important for a different tax, namely the excise on commercial diesel. Differences in 
excise duties between European countries have a potentially important impact on the 
fuelling behavior of transport companies. Indeed, most trucks can cover between 1500 
and 3000 kilometers on a single tank. As excise duties account for between 10 to 12 
percent of the running cost of road haulage companies, active fiscal planning of 
international transport routes can substantially save on production costs. As a 
response, European governments may strategically set their diesel excise rates so as to 
attract trucks to fuel in their country and thus maximize the fiscal revenue from their 
excise duties. 
 Analyzing tax competition in diesel excises is particularly interesting for at 
least four reasons. First, trucks are highly mobile so that fueling behavior is elastic in 
                                                 
2 There is a substantial emprical literature that estimates fiscal reaction functions for local governments 
as well, see Bruckner (2002) for an overview. 
3 A related literature explores how jurisdictions strategically determine their stringency of 
environmental regulations. In response to regulations in neighbouring jurisdictions, they may thus 
reduce this stringency in order to attract foreign direct investment, see Levinson (2003) for an 
overview.  
demand, at least for an individual European country. Hence, one might expect that tax 
competition is especially intense in the field of diesel excises. Second, the European 
Union has imposed a minimum excise rate on diesel in 1992. Inspired by the Treaty of 
Rome (Article 99(old)), the EU first introduced a proposal (Com(87)327) for 
harmonizing mineral oil excises in 1987. This proposal has subsequently been 
modified into a policy of minimum excise rates. These harmonization efforts seem to 
have affected the excise levels. Indeed, we observe a rising trend in the diesel excise 
in Europe during the last 20 years, but especially during the harmonization period of 
the late 1980s (see section 3 for further details). Hence, it may seem that the minimum 
excise level has significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition in European 
diesel excises. The question is, however, whether these tax harmonization efforts have 
also affected the strategic tax interactions between countries, i.e. the other way of 
measuring the intensity of tax competition. A third reason why diesel excises are 
interesting is that, contrary to differences in effective corporate tax rates, differences 
in diesel excises are less likely to create distortions in the international allocation of 
real capital. Hence, tax competition is due to international tax arbitrage, rather than a 
reallocation of production. In this respect, tax competition with diesel excises is 
reminiscent to tax competition in statutory corporate tax rates (which is important for 
profit shifting within multinational companies) or other indirect taxes such as VAT 
and other excises (determining the incentives for cross-border shopping), which also 
involve a form of international tax arbitrage.4 A final reason why tax competition in 
diesel excises is interesting to explore is that it involves a specific tax, rather than an 
ad-valorem tax (which is the case with corporate taxes or VAT). As specific taxes 
tend to fall over time in real terms due to inflation, countries regularly upgrade their 
excise rates, either on a discretionary basis or by means of indexation. This implies 
substantial variation in excise levels over time.  
In estimating our Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for diesel excises, this 
paper exploits a panel of 17 European countries between 1978 and 2001. Apart from 
exploring the magnitude of the strategic tax interactions, these data allow us to 
examine three other propositions that play a role in the debate on tax competition. 
                                                 
4 Note that one of the concerns of the European Commission is that trucks and buses make a detour to 
make use of cheaper fuel, thereby exacerbating environmental problems in Europe. Together with the 
fear for aggressive tax competition, this has lead to a proposal for a harmonized excise duty on 
commercial diesel fuel, to be introduced in 2010, see COM (2002)410 final. This is to replace the 
current minimum excise rate. 
First, we consider how strategic tax setting between countries is influenced by 
coordination efforts of the European Union. In particular, as our data cover both the 
pre-harmonization period and the post-harmonization period, we can test how the 
imposition of a minimum excise rate has actually changed the strategic tax setting 
among countries. Second, we explore whether country size matters for tax 
competition. The literature has shown that country size indeed matters for the level of 
tax that countries set in a tax competition game (Bucovetski, 1991; Kanbur and Keen, 
1993). We empirically explore whether it also matters for their responsiveness to 
other countries’ tax rates. Finally, following Devereux et al. (2002b), we analyze 
whether the magnitude of the initial excise rate matters for the strategic tax response 
of a country. In particular, Devereux et al. (2002b) find that countries featuring a 
relatively high tax rate respond more strongly to tax changes in neighboring countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model to 
understand the strategic tax interactions of diesel excises. It also discusses how a 
minimum tax rate affects the outcome of the Nash game. Section 3 describes the data 
and the empirical specification of the model. Section 4 reports the empirical results. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
 
We develop a partial equilibrium model, describing two countries and a single taxed 
good called diesel. Superscript h refers to the home country and superscript f refers to 
the foreign country. We assume that both countries host a transport sector that exerts 
demand for diesel. The size of the transport sector in the two countries may differ. In 
particular, the home country hosts H transport companies, while in the foreign country 
there are F such firms. Note that size here does not refer to ownership, but rather to 
the amount of goods transported through a country, e.g. the amount of kilometers 
driven by trucks within the borders of a country. 
 The price of diesel, p, is determined on competitive world markets. A large 
number of identical transport firms in each of the two countries are unable to affect 
this market price. In fact, we take the aggregate world demand for diesel as fixed. The 
government in both countries levies an excise on diesel, described by respectively τh 
and τf. The tax rates are set independently in a Nash-setting. The excise is a specific 
tax levied on each unit of diesel, i.e. independent of price. We assume that the origin 
principle applies in the sense that transport companies pay the excise duty at the place 
where diesel is actually bought. 
 
Fueling behavior of transport firms 
 
Firms in the transport sector buy diesel either in their home country or abroad, e.g. 
while transporting goods to a foreign location. In their home country, they pay a price 
inclusive of tax equal to p + τh. Buying diesel in the foreign country goes at a price p 
+ τf. If the tax rates in the two countries would be equal, truck drivers would be 
indifferent between fueling at home or abroad. In that case, the average number of 
litres diesel used in a country (i.e. our measure of the size of the transport sector), will 
be more or less equal to the number of litres fueled. In the presence of different excise 
rates this will no longer be the case. For some companies, exploiting the opportunities 
for international tax arbitrage goes without cost. Hence, they will fuel in the low-tax 
country if possible, even with small tax rate differentials. For other companies, there 
may be some costs involved in fueling in the low-tax country, e.g. because they have 
to make a detour, the surface of their home country is large, or they fuel more often. 
Therefore, we introduce a cost of fueling in a foreign country, cih ε [0, βh]. This cost 
differs across firms. Subscript i is used to refer to a particular transport firm. As long 
as the home country is the low-tax country, i.e. τh < τ f, firms in the home country will 
always decide to fuel at home. If the home country is the high-tax country, i.e. τh > τf , 
then transport company i minimizes its costs when fueling in the foreign country if 
and only if the following condition holds: 
 
p + τh > p + τf + cih         (1) 
 
or, equivalently: 
 
τh - τf > cih          (1’) 
 
Hence, firms fuel abroad if the gains of lower tax payments exceed the additional 
costs of fueling abroad. If condition (1’) does not hold, a company will fuel in the 
home country.  
We assume that the heterogeneous cost of fueling diesel abroad, cih, follows a 
continuous cumulative density function Gh (cih). For each tax differential, there thus 
exists a value ch*, at which a firm is indifferent between fueling in the home country 
or fueling in the foreign country, i.e. τh - τf = ch*. All domestic firms featuring a higher 
value cih > ch* will fuel in the home country, while all firms featuring cih < ch* will 
fuel in the foreign country. The fraction of firms that will fuel in the foreign country is 
therefore equal to Gh (ch*), while the corresponding density at this point is gh (ch*). For 
transport companies in the foreign country, a similar story applies in the case τh < τf. 
 
Revenue maximization by governments 
 
We assume that each government behaves in a Nash manner. It chooses its own tax 
rate to maximize its revenue, while taking the tax rate of the other country as given. 
Tax revenue in the home country R (τh, τf) is given by: 
 
R (τh, τf) =  τh H [1– Gh (τh - τf)]   if τh > τf 
           (2) 
  = τh H + τh F Gf (τf - τh)  if τh < τf  
 
Expression (2) reveals that, as long as the tax rate exceeds the rate in the foreign 
country, τh > τf, some domestic transport companies will fuel abroad, thereby eroding 
the tax base in the home country. If the home country features a lower tax rate than its 
neighbor, τh < τf, some trucks from the foreign country will decide to fuel in the home 
country, thereby broadening the tax base in the home country and raising extra tax 
revenue.  
 Maximizing (2) yields the following best response of the home country’s tax 
rate for a given rate in the foreign country: 
 
τh (τf) =  [1– Gh (ch*)] / gh (ch*) = R (τh, τf) / τh H gh(ch*)   if τh > τf 
           (3) 
 = [H/F + Gf (cf*)] / gf (cf*) = R (τh, τf) / τh F gf(cf*)  if τh < τf 
 
This first-order condition (3) yields the implicit tax reaction function of a general 
form. It reveals that the optimal tax rate for a home government, given the tax rate in 
the foreign country, is determined by the marginal loss in tax revenue due to a higher 
rate. If the home country happens to be the high-tax country (τh > τf), this impact 
depends on H gh(.) in the denominator of (3), which reflects the marginal reduction in 
the tax base (i.e. the marginal loss in revenue from diesel fueled at home by domestic 
transport companies) in response to a higher domestic tax rate. If it is the low-tax 
country (τh < τf) the impact depends similarly on F gf(.), i.e. the marginal loss in 
revenue from diesel fueled at home by foreign companies. 
To more clearly illustrate the intuition behind the tax reaction function in (3), 
let us consider the special case of a uniform distribution for gj(.) on the interval [0, βj] 
for j = h, f. With such a uniform distribution, we have Gj (cj) =  cj / βj and gj (cj) = 1 / 
βj for j = h, f. The first-order condition for the best response of the home country’s tax 
now reads:5 
 
τh (τf) =  ½ (τf + H/F βf)    if  τf < H/F βf 
 = τf    if  H/F βf < βh    (4) 
 =  ½ (τf + βh)    if  τf > βh 
 
Expression (4) suggests that a higher foreign tax rate will raise the tax rate in the 
home country if the cost of fueling abroad follows the uniform distribution. With 
small and large initial foreign tax rates, the response in (4) is exactly ½. For the case 
H/F βf < βh, if it exists at all, the home country sets its tax equal to that in the foreign 
country.  
Assuming that βh = βf, Kanbur and Keen (1993) use (4) to show that small 
countries will always set their tax rates lower than large countries in the Nash 
equilibrium. In expression (4), this is reflected in the term H/F, which measures the 
size of the transport sector in the home country, relative to the foreign country. The 
intuition for this is the following. Suppose that both countries start with the same tax 
rate. Now the increase in the demand for diesel from a marginal cut in the tax rate 
depends on the size of the tax base in the other country. For the small country, this tax 
base is large so that the broadening of the domestic tax base is substantial if it lowers 
its tax. For the large country, the opposite holds. As a result, the small country will 
always find it optimal to set its tax rate lower than the large country.  
                                                 
5 The tax reaction function in (4) is a slight generalization of Kanbur and Keen (1993). They derive tax 
reaction functions for general consumption taxes in the presence of cross-border shopping. 
 We use the uniform distribution in (4) only to illustrate the intuition behind the 
tax reaction function. For more general (cumulative) density functions for cih and cif, 
expression (3) will take a more general form. In the case of tax arbitrage with respect 
to commercial diesel use a non-uniform distribution seems more likely. Indeed, a 
number of trucks can probably choose their location to fuel without costs. This would 
imply that the distribution function Gj (cj) is skewed to zero. In the empirical section, 
we propose a more general tax reaction function to estimate how European 
governments actually respond to each other’s diesel excise rates. Thereby, we also 
explore the impact of country size (i.e. the term H/F) and the tax gap (i.e. the first or 
second term in (3)). Before doing so, however, we first explore how the imposition of 
a minimum excise rate affects the outcome of the Nash game. 
 
The impact of a minimum tax rate 
 
The EU agreed upon a harmonized excise rate in 1987, which was later modified into 
a minimum excise rate in 1992. For some low-tax countries, the minimum excise 
level actually appeared to be binding. How does such a minimum affect the Nash-
game between countries? 
 Suppose that the EU imposes a lower bound η on the tax rate of countries h 
and f in the previous model. This minimum is assumed to be binding for the low-tax 
country, which we assume is country f.6 In case of a uniform distribution, Kanbur and 
Keen (1993) show that, if a Nash equilibrium exists, it must be that: 
 
τf = η         (5) 
τh  = ½ (η + βh) 
 
Hence, the low-tax country sets its tax rate equal to the minimum level, while the 
response to this by the high-tax country does not change compared to that in 
expression (4). Hence, a minimum rate is likely to raise the tax rate in some countries. 
However, it is not a priori clear that it reduces the strategic tax interactions. In the 
next section, we include the minimum rate in our regressions and empirically explore 
whether the minimum affects the fiscal reactions of countries to each other’s tax rates 
                                                 
6 If the minimum tax would be non-binding for the low-tax country, the outcome in (3) would be 
unchanged. 
in Europe. Thus, we test the Kanbur-Keen hypothesis reflected in (5) for the case of 
excises on commercial diesel. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
As to the econometric specification of (3), we estimate the following linear fiscal 
reaction function, where n countries compete in a Nash-setting for fiscal revenue from 
diesel excises:7 
 
τti = ∑ ωi τt-i ß + Xti θ + di φ + dt η + εti  i  =  1, … n  (6) 
 
where index i stands for a home country, –i denotes all foreign countries, and t is an 
index for time. The variable τti  is our tax measure, ωi is a weighting matrix discussed 
below, Xti is a vector of exogenous control variables, di are country fixed effects, dt 
are time fixed effects, and εti is an error term which is assumed to be normally 
distributed. The parameters ß, φ, η and the vector θ will be estimated. The key 
coefficient in (6) is the reaction of country i to the tax rates of other countries –i, 
which is reflected by ß.  
Equation (6) contains a so called weighting matrix, in which row i is denoted 
by ωi. It determines which foreign countries’ tax rates exert an impact on a particular 
countries’ tax. We explore alternative weighting matrices to check the robustness of 
the strategic tax responses. In particular, our benchmark is that country i only 
responds to the tax rate of countries that share a common border. Hence, row ωi 
contains a zero if a particular country –i does not share a common border with country 
i, and a positive weight if there is a common border.8 The tax rates of neighboring 
countries that feature a positive weight are equally weighted in ωi, with the weights 
summing up to one. Subsequently, we analyze a weighting matrix in which all 
countries within a range of 1000 kilometer feature positive weights, and explore trade 
shares instead of uniform shares. Before elaborating further on the econometric 
methodology, we first discuss the data. 
                                                 
7 Compare Devereux et al. (2002b) and Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002). 
8 For the Netherlands–Luxembourg and Italy–Greece, we also impose a positive weight. In the former 
case, the two countries are small and close to each other while many transport flows from and to the 
Netherlands pass through Luxemburg. The latter case is a necessary assumption, because otherwise 
Greece would not have any neighboring country in our weighting matrix. Excluding Greece from our 
sample, however, hardly influence our results. 
 Diesel excise measure 
 
For the excise rate on diesel, we use data from a balanced panel of 15 countries of the 
European Union, plus Norway and Switzerland. The data are taken from the 
OECD/IEA Energy Prices and Taxes, which provide information about both diesel 
excise levels and prices for the period 1978-2001. As a measure for the excise rate, 
we take the ratio of the excise and the price inclusive of excises (but exclusive of 
VAT). The reason for taking this ratio is that it provides a comparable measure for the 
excise rate across countries. Moreover, it is not sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations 
that appeared in the pre-1999 period in the EU.9  
 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, respectively, the development of the mean value for 
the excise ratio between 1978 and 2001, and its coefficient of variation (standard 
variation across countries divided by the mean). The appendix presents the 
development of the excise ratio for each of the countries separately. Figure 3.1 reveals 
that the excise ratio in Europe gradually increased over time. In particular, where 
excises made up around one quarter of the after-tax diesel price during the late 1970s, 
this share was more than doubled in the late 1990s. This rise was especially 
significant between 1985 and 1995. This is exactly the period in which the EU 
adopted its harmonization policy regarding diesel excises. In particular, in 1987 the 
European Union implemented its first proposal aimed at harmonizing excise rates. 
Apparently, countries anticipated this, as we observe that the excise ratios started to 
rise already in 1985. The harmonized excise rate has been gradually increased 
between 1987 and 1992, when the harmonized rate was transformed into a minimum 
rate.10 
Since 1992, this minimum rate has remained unchanged at a level of € 0.245 
per litre. Because the excise involves a specific tax, i.e. per unit of consumption, the 
real value of this minimum excise rate gradually fell since 1992. This has made the 
minimum excise less important for the development of the excise ratio in European 
                                                 
9 For the pre-1999 period, the excise rates are expressed in 1999 Euro conversion rates. Hence, 
exchange rate fluctuations in the pre-1999 period are not captured by the data for excise levels. As they 
can be important for the real value of the excise levels, we prefer to use the excise ratios rather than 
excise levels.  
10 Note that, although Norway and Switzerland are not members of the EU, the minimum rate is not 
binding for them. For Norway, the introduction of the EU minimum was accompanied by a rise in the 
level of the excise so as to conform with the trend in the rest of Europe. 
countries. Indeed, as most countries index their excises rates to inflation or increase 
them on a discretionary basis, the gap between the actual excise levels and the 
minimum level has increased after 1992.11 In 2000 and 2001, we observe a sharp 
reduction in the excise ratio in figure 3.1. This is due to an increase in the pre-tax 
diesel price, which pulls down both the excise ratio and the minimum rate. Overall, 
the results suggest that the minimum excise rate has significantly reduced the intensity 
of tax competition, as measured by the development in the level of the excise ratio.12 
In 2003, the minimum was only binding for Greece, while Luxemburg was only 
slightly above the minimum rate at € 0.253 per litre. 
 
Figure 3.1: Mean and minimum diesel excise ratio in Europe, 1978-2001 
20
30
40
50
60
1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999
ex
ci
se
 ra
tio
average
minimum
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the development in the spread in excise ratios across European 
countries. It shows that the gradual increase in the excise ratios between 1978 and 
2001 was accompanied by a steady reduction in the variation across countries. Indeed, 
the period until 1992 shows a process of rapid convergence (sigma convergence): the 
coefficient of variation dropped from over 60% in the early 1980s to around 16% in 
1992. Again, the harmonization efforts of the EU have been responsible for this 
development. Indeed, the appendix reveals that the minimum excise has been binding 
for a number of low-tax countries. By raising their excises to conform to the 
                                                 
11 Note that changes in the net of tax diesel price do not affect the difference between the average and 
the minimum excise ratio.  
12 In a recent proposal, the Finance ministers of the EU agreed  upon a proposal for a new Directive on 
Taxation of Energy Products, originally put forward in COM(1997)30. The aim is to increase the 
minimum excise duty to € 0.33 per litre by 2012. 
minimum European rate, this triggered the process of convergence.13 Yet, we do not 
observe full convergence: the variation has not entirely disappeared since 1992 and 
even tends to rise a bit lately. 
 
Figure 3.2: Coefficient of variation of diesel excise ratio, 1978-2001 
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Control variables 
 
We explicitly control for a number of exogenous variables that affect a countries’ tax 
rate (see table 3.1 for some descriptive statistics) in expression (6). As is clear from 
(3), the vector of controls should contain a measure for the size of the transport sector 
in a country. Size here is not determined by ownership of transport companies, but 
rather by the number of kilometers that trucks drive through a country. As we do not 
have direct access to this measure, we include two other variables to capture this 
effect. These are taken from the World Road Statistics Database from the 
International Road Federation. First, we take the length of motorways (ROAD) as an 
indicator for country size. In addition to this, we include the number of trucks divided 
by the number of passenger cars in a country (TRUCKSHARE) to obtain an indicator 
                                                 
13 By testing for β-convergence, we obtain a coefficient of β = –5.42 (t-value –15.23). Hence, a country 
featuring an excise rate that deviates from the European mean gradually moves towards this mean. On 
average, the excise gap is reduced by 5.42% annually. Computing the speed of β-convergence in the 
corporate tax rates of 13 European countries used by Devereux et al. (2002ab), we get β = –1.83 for the 
statutory rates (t-value –2.93) and β = –2.56 for the average effective tax rates (t-value –5.89). Hence, 
diesel excises have converged faster in Europe than corporate tax rates which have not been subject to 
harmonization efforts of the EU.  
for the (relative) size of the transport sector. Together, these two variables should 
provide an appropriate measure for the size of the transport sector of a country. 
Diesel excise rates are probably influenced by lobbying behavior of transport 
companies. To capture this potential impact of the diesel lobby, we use the ratio of 
diesel consumption to the number of inhabitants of a country (DIESELCAP).14 
 Diesel excises involve specific taxes. Many countries index these excises to 
prices or adjust them on a discretionary basis in order to avoid a gradual depreciation 
of its real value. This contrasts with ad-valorem taxes such as VAT or corporate taxes, 
which are not indexed. If all tax authorities would adjust excises to (local) inflation, 
the excises are likely to follow a trend. Without correction, this would wrongly be 
taken as evidence for tax competition (ceteris paribus the diesel price). Therefore, we 
control for the PRICE index in estimating (6). We also control for the DIESELPRICE, 
which directly affects the excise ratio. Also the minimum diesel excise rate set by the 
EU may result in a (spurious) pattern of strategic tax interactions if we do not control 
for it. Indeed, countries are likely to adapt their tax rates in similar directions in 
response to the harmonization efforts of the EU (see also section 2). Therefore, we 
also control for the minimum excise rate (MIN) in our regressions.  
Finally, we include fixed effects, di, to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
between countries. In terms of (3), the fixed effects may reflect the country-specific 
parameters βi, i = 1,..., n. In addition to this, we include time fixed effects to control 
for common shocks across countries.  
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
ROAD 2.25 11.00 0.01 2.78 
TRUCKSHARE 0.16 2.65 0.01 0.20 
DIESELCAP 0.27 1.78 0.07 0.21 
PRICE 0.79 1.31 0.06 0.26 
DIESELPRICE 0.20 0.32 0.10 0.05 
MIN 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.12 
 
                                                 
14 We also experimented with the share of diesel in total consumption of fuel (gasoline and diesel), 
without any effect on our main conclusions. 
Econometric procedure 
 
The tax ratios on the left-hand-side of (6) are potentially endogenous. Indeed, if 
countries play a Nash game, they respond to each other’s tax rates, which directly 
implies an endogeneity problem (Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002; Brueckner, 2002). 
To control for this endogeneity, we estimate (6) using two-stage-least-squares. In 
particular, we estimate an equation with the endogenous regressors from (6) as the 
dependent variable, i.e. ωi τt-i. The exogenous regressors and some additional 
variables that are independent of τt-i in equation (6), are then used as instrument 
variables. Thus, we first estimate: 
 
ωi τt-i = ß1 ∑ ωi Xt-i + ß2Xti θ + ß3 di φ + ß4 dt η + εti    (7) 
 
with ∑ ωi Xt-i being the weighted exogenous variables, defined in the same way as the 
weighted tax rate. In a second step, the fitted values for the endogenous regressor ωi τt-
i
  
                                                
for each of the countries are inserted into (6), which is then estimated using OLS. 
We first estimate a fixed effects model by including a country specific 
constant di as in (6). These fixed effects di eliminate the possible problem of omission 
of unobserved country characteristics that are fixed over time. We also included time 
fixed effects, dt, to control for common time shocks. Secondly, we estimate (6) in 
first-differences. The first-differences model captures the reaction of a country to 
changes in the other countries’ tax rates. By removing stochastic trends using two 
period lags, the first-difference model estimates only short-term relations between the 
variables. Following Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002), we use two-year intervals to 
minimize the loss of data and to deal with the lag of political response to changes in 
the tax ratios of other countries.15 
 In estimating the strategic tax responses in (6), we concentrate on the 
estimated coefficient for the other countries’ tax rate, i.e. ß. This parameter is 
interpreted as a measure for the intensity of tax competition across European 
countries. It is not a priori clear that this measure for tax competition is equivalent 
across countries and across time. Indeed, the intensity of tax competition may be 
influenced by the introduction of a minimum excise rate, or may differ between large 
 
15 We also explored one and three year lags. This had little impact on the results. Results available on 
request. 
and small countries, or between high-tax and low-tax countries. To analyze whether 
the intensity of tax competition depends on these variables, we explore how the 
estimated value for ß is affected by three variables: (i) the minimum excise in the EU; 
(ii) country size; and (iii) the size of the tax gap, i.e. the tax ratio of a country relative 
to the median tax ratio in Europe. In analyzing this impact, we modify the coefficient 
ß in equation (6) and (7) by adding a cross term, i.e. we estimate ß+γZ, where Z 
measures either the minimum excise (MIN), or country size (SIZE) or the tax gap 
(TAXGAP). If γ appears to be significantly negative, this is an indication that variable 
Z reduces the strategic responses of governments. If γ turns out positive, variable Z is 
accompanied by more aggressive tax competition. 
 
4. Regression results 
 
This section discusses our regression results. First, we present the estimates of (6) in a 
benchmark regression. Thereby, we show our results for both the fixed effects model 
and the model in first differences. Then, we explore alternative weighting matrices. 
Subsequently, we analyze how the intensity of tax competition is affected by the 
additional covariates: minimum excise, country size and tax gap.  
 
Do countries respond to each other’s tax rates? 
 
Table 4.1 shows the regression results in a benchmark case. For the weighting matrix 
we assume that countries respond only to their neighbors, i.e. countries that share a 
common border, with uniform weights for these countries. The first two columns in 
table 4.1 show the coefficients for the fixed effects model, both without and with price 
variables. The last three columns show the same estimates in which we control for 
country fixed effect by the method of first differencing. Thereby, we use two-year 
lags for all variables. The final column excludes time fixed effects. 
 The table shows that the estimated coefficient for the tax interaction term is 
significantly positive in all specifications. The price variables exert a significant 
impact on the tax ratio. On the basis of the Wald-test statistic, we find that including 
price variables indeed gives the preferred specification compared to models excluding 
prices. This holds both for the fixed effects model and the first-difference model.16 
We take the first-difference model as our preferred specification. The reason is that 
the fixed effects model suffers from potential unit root problems. Indeed, the error 
terms in the fixed effects model show a time trend for some of the countries in our 
sample. This may create spurious correlation. The first difference model does not 
suffer from this problem.  
In the first-difference model, we see that indexation of excises is important as 
the price variable exerts a significant impact on the tax ratio. Moreover, as can be 
expected from the definition of the excise ratio, the diesel price has a statistically 
significant negative impact on the ratio. The minimum excise level exerts a positive 
impact but is only significant at the 10% level.  
The strategic tax response in the first-difference model with price effects is 
0.23 if we include time fixed effects. This suggests that a 10% increase in the excise 
ratio of neighboring countries will systematically increase a countries’ own tax rate by 
between 2.3%. This is consistent with the presence of tax competition in diesel 
excises. The strategic tax response is robust for alternative specifications. In the other 
columns of table 4.1, we find a significant strategic tax term, the magnitude of which 
moves between 0.17 (in the first-differences model without price variables) and 0.48 
(the first-difference model without time fixed effects). Including time fixed effects 
appears to be important. Indeed, if we exclude time fixed effects from the regression, 
as in the final column of table 4.1, the strategic tax term increase from 0.23 to 0.48. 
The neighbor’s tax may thus capture common shocks that are correlated with the tax 
term. Ignoring time fixed effects may thus cause a bias in the estimates. 
                                                 
16 The value of the Wald-test for including price variables is 70.26 for the fixed effects model and 
17.53 for the model in first differences. 
Table 4.1 Fiscal reaction function estimatesa 
 Fixed effects First differences 
Neighbors’ tax ratio 0.38*** 
(3.12) 
0.32*** 
(3.97) 
0.17** 
(2.04) 
0.23*** 
(2.76) 
0.48*** 
(7.09) 
ROAD 
-0.04*  
(-1.92) 
-0.09***  
(-6.18) 
-0.02 
(-0.88) 
-0.03 
(-1.41) 
-0.02  
(-1.09) 
TRUCKSHARE 
0.02 
(1.59) 
0.02*** 
(2.69) 
0.01* 
(1.92) 
0.01* 
(1.76) 
0.01 
(1.43) 
DIESELCAP 
0.04 
(0.72) 
0.12*** 
(3.17) 
-0.07 
(-1.02) 
-0.06 
(-0.90) 
-0.07 
(-0.94) 
MIN 
0.28 
(0.67) 
-0.50** 
(-2.08) 
0.35*** 
(3.78) 
0.20*  
(1.90) 
0.03 
(0.98) 
PRICE 
 0.46*** 
(7.02) 
 0.33*** 
(3.02) 
0.42*** 
(4.11) 
DIESELPRICE 
 0.10 
(0.64) 
 -0.42*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.50*** 
(-6.80) 
      
R2 0.51 0.78 0.42 0.45 0.41 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No No No 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
No. of observations 374 374 340 340 340 
No. of countries 17 17 17 17 17 
a *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level;** at 5% level; * at 10% level. T-values in brackets 
 
As a robustness check we experimented with alternative weighing matrices for the 
model in first-differences. In particular, our benchmark (first column of table 4.2) 
adopts the assumption that only neighboring countries exert an impact on a countries’ 
tax and that all these neighbors feature a common impact. Table 4.2 shows the results 
of two alternative weights. In the second column of table 4.2, we present an estimate 
for the reaction function where the weights are determined by trade shares. In 
particular, we use the share of imports + export of a particular country in the total of 
imports + exports in all European countries as weights. Still, we assume here that only 
neighbors’ taxes are relevant. In the third column, we not only include neighboring 
countries in the weighting matrix, but also other European countries that are located 
within a range of 1000 kilometers from a particular country, using the distances 
between capitals of countries as an indicator for location. Table 4.2 reveals that our 
results are not sensitive to these alternative specifications of the weighting matrix. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Fiscal reaction functions with alternative weighting matrices a 
 Neighbors with 
uniform shares 
Neighbors with 
trade shares 
Countries within 
1000 km circle 
Neighbors’ tax ratio 0.23*** 
(2.76) 
0.25*** 
(2.96) 
0.23*** 
(2.83) 
ROAD 
-0.03 
(-1.41) 
-0.03 
(-1.47) 
-0.03 
(-1.35) 
TRUCKSHARE 
0.01* 
(1.76) 
0.01* 
(1.69) 
0.01* 
(1.72) 
DIESELCAP 
-0.06 
(-0.90) 
-0.06 
(-0.87) 
-0.06 
(-0.88) 
MIN 
0.20*  
(1.90) 
0.18*  
(1.72) 
0.19*  
(1.80) 
PRICE 
0.33*** 
(3.02) 
0.33*** 
(3.02) 
0.32*** 
(2.95) 
DIESELPRICE 
-0.42*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.42*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.43*** 
(-3.67) 
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 
a *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level;** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. T-values are in 
brackets. The regressions refer to the model in first differences, including time fixed effects. 
 
 
What determines the intensity of tax competition? 
 
We now explore whether strategic tax responses depend on the harmonization policy 
imposed by the EU. In particular, we explore changes in our tax response variable by 
including (alternative specifications of) a cross-term in the regression. The first 
specification captures the minimum rate, i.e. it estimates a coefficient for Neighbor’s 
tax * MIN. Subsequently, we analyze the cross-impact of a dummy for the year of 
harmonization 1987, and a time trend. The latter is used to explore whether strategic 
tax responses have significantly declined over time. Table 4.3 shows the results.  
 
Table 4.3 Fiscal reaction functions and the impact of the minimum ratea 
 Base case Impact of the 
minimum 
Impact of 
harmonization 
Impact of time 
trend 
Neighbors’ tax ratio 0.23*** 
(2.76) 
0.39*** 
(3.17) 
0.40*** 
(3.20) 
0.41*** 
(2.21) 
Neighbor’s tax * MIN 
 -1.29* 
(-1.76) 
  
Neighbor’s tax * Dummy87 
  -0.30* 
(-1.81) 
 
Neighbor’s tax * TIME 
   -0.016 
(-1.08) 
ROAD 
-0.03 
(-1.41) 
-0.03 
(-1.34) 
-0.03 
(-1.33) 
-0.03 
(-1.36) 
TRUCKSHARE 
0.01* 
(1.76) 
0.01 
(1.62) 
0.01 
(1.64) 
0.01* 
(1.70) 
DIESELCAP 
-0.06 
(-0.90) 
-0.06 
(-0.89) 
-0.06 
(-0.89) 
-0.06 
(-0.88) 
MIN 
0.20*  
(1.90) 
0.18*  
(1.65) 
0.17  
(1.63) 
0.19*  
(1.75) 
PRICE 
0.33*** 
(3.02) 
0.30*** 
(2.71) 
0.30*** 
(2.73) 
0.31*** 
(2.79) 
DIESELPRICE 
-0.42*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.41*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.41*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.41*** 
(-3.54) 
     
R2 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.54 
a *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level;** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. T-values are in 
brackets. 
The regressions refer to the model in first differences, including time fixed effects and price variables. 
 
The results indicate that the minimum tax rate has reduced the intensity of tax 
competition in the form of strategic tax responses. Indeed, the estimates for the cross-
terms in table 4.3 are all negative. The specification with the dummy variable for 
1987 is most easily interpreted: it suggests that the strategic tax interaction term falls 
from 0.40 for the pre-harmonization period (where Dummy87 is zero) to 0.10 for the 
post-harmonization period (where the Dummy87 is 1).17 This suggests that the 
minimum tax rate has reduced the intensity of tax competition to a considerable 
extent, although it has not disappeared entirely. However, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level in each of the three specifications (although it 
is significant at the 10% level in case of MIN or Dummy87). Hence, we cannot reject 
                                                 
17 The model with the minimum rate instead of Dummy87 allows for more variation in the effect of the 
minimum excise level on the strategic interaction. Evaluated at the minimum rate that was imposed in 
1992 of 0.245, the strategic tax term for the post-harmonisation period is 0.08 (computed as 0.39 – 1.29 
* 0.245), compared to 0.39 for the pre-harmonisation period (where the minimum was zero). Evaluated 
at the mean value for the minimum over the entire sample period of 0.14, we obtain an average 
coefficient for the entire sample period of  0,20 (computed as 0,39 – 1.29*0.14 = 0.20). This is close 
the coefficient without the cross-term. 
the hypothesis that tax competition has maintained equally intense after the 
introduction of the minimum rate. 
 Finally, table 4.4 considers whether the strategic tax responses are affected by 
country size or the tax gap. In particular, we first include a cross-term in the 
regression which captures the impact of country size, measured by GDP, i.e. 
Neighbor’s tax * GDP.18 Next we include two alternative cross-terms capturing the 
impact of the tax gap. First, the tax gap is measured by a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if a country features a tax rate above the median tax in the sample for a 
particular year and zero otherwise. Hence, we estimate the term Neighbor’s tax * 
Dummy_hightax. Second, we measure the tax gap by the difference between a tax 
ratio and the median in the sample, i.e. Neighbor’s tax * Tax_difference. The impact 
of the tax rate also follows from our theoretical model, where (3) allows for different 
tax responses of high-tax and low-tax countries.  
Table 4.4 Fiscal reaction functions and the impact of size and the tax ratea 
 Base case Impact of 
Size 
Impact of  
high_tax 
Impact of tax 
difference 
Neighbors’ tax ratio 0.23*** 
(2.76) 
0.22*** 
(2.56) 
0.23** 
(2.50) 
0.22*** 
(2.60) 
Neighbor’s tax * GDP 
 
 0.002 
(0.33) 
  
Neighbor’s tax * 
Dummy_hightax 
  0.15* 
(1.66) 
 
Neighbor’s tax * 
Tax_difference 
 
   0.39*** 
(3.36) 
ROAD 
-0.03 
(-1.41) 
-0.03 
(-1.37) 
-0.02 
(-1.27) 
-0.02 
(-1.43) 
TRUCKSHARE 
0.01* 
(1.76) 
0.01* 
(1.75) 
0.01 
(1.52) 
0.01* 
(1.65) 
DIESELCAP 
-0.06 
(-0.90) 
-0.06 
(-0.88) 
-0.05 
(-0.74) 
-0.06 
(-0.83) 
MIN 
0.20*  
(1.90) 
0.20*  
(1.88) 
0.17*  
(1.66) 
0.17  
(1.63) 
PRICE 
0.33*** 
(3.02) 
0.33*** 
(3.04) 
0.32*** 
(2.89) 
0.34*** 
(3.12) 
DIESELPRICE 
-0.42*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.42*** 
(-3.54) 
-0.43*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.45*** 
(-3.90) 
     
R2 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.48 
a *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level;** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. T-values are in 
brackets. The regressions refer to the model in first differences, including time fixed effects and price 
variables. 
 
                                                 
18 We also tried population and the number of trucks as indicators for size, but this does not change the 
results. 
The second column of table 4.4 reports a positive cross-term for Neighbor’s tax * 
SIZE. This suggests that large countries respond more aggressively to their neighbor’s 
tax rate than small countries do. The coefficient is not significant, however. Hence, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the strategic tax responses are equal between 
small and large countries.  
The third and fourth columns in table 4.4 report a positive cross-term for 
Neighbor’s tax * Dummy_hightax or Tax_difference. High-tax countries thus appear 
to respond more aggressively to the tax rate in their neighboring country than low-tax 
countries do. This result is similar to the findings reported by Devereux et al. (2001) 
regarding the relatively strong corporate tax response by high-tax countries compared 
to low-tax countries. In case of the dummy for high-tax countries, we obtain 
significance only at the 10% level. The coefficient suggests that the tax response of 
high-tax countries is 0.38 compared to only 0.23 for low-tax countries. With the size 
of the tax gap, as measured by the tax difference with the median tax ratio, the final 
column in table 4.4 reveals a significant impact even at the 1% level. The coefficient 
of 0.39 can be easily interpreted. To illustrate, if we evaluate the coefficient at a tax 
differential of 0.5, i.e. for a country with a tax ratio that is 50% above the median 
level in the EU, the strategic tax response of that country equals 0.42 (i.e. 0.22 + 0.5 * 
0.39), compared to 0.22 for a country at the median rate.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Following recent papers that empirically assess strategic interactions among countries 
with respect to corporate taxes, this paper estimates fiscal reaction functions for diesel 
excises in Europe. The estimates reveal that a 10% higher tax rate in neighboring 
countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by around 
2 to 3%. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. This provides evidence 
for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises in Europe. We find evidence that 
the magnitude of the tax rate matters for the intensity of tax competition. In particular, 
high-tax countries compete more aggressively than low-tax tax countries. We find no 
evidence for the impact of country size on the intensity of tax competition. 
 Harmonization efforts of the EU have contributed to raise the average diesel 
excise in Europe and lead to convergence of rates. This suggests that the minimum 
excise rate has reduced the intensity of tax competition in the EU. Also the strategic 
tax interactions tend to decline in response to the minimum rate. Strategic tax 
responses do not disappear, however. Moreover, the impact of the minimum rate on 
the strategic tax responses is not statistically significant. Hence, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the minimum excise imposed since 1987 has not significantly reduced 
the intensity of tax competition as measured by the size of strategic tax interactions. 
This may yield an important lesson for other areas in which tax competition is 
important, such as corporate taxation. Indeed, imposing a minimum rate may be 
effective in avoiding a tax race to the bottom (which is often seen as harmful), while 
at the same time it maintains incentives for governments to compete and thus to tame 
the Leviathan. Hence, a minimum rate may strike an optimal balance between pros 
and cons of tax competition. 
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Appendix: Minimum excises in ECU/Euro and development of excises  
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Remarks: 
Excises after1999 in Euros for Euro-countries, data before 1999 local currencies 
converted with fixed 1999 Euro rate. Non Euro-countries loc.al currencies coverted to 
yearly average  
 
 
EU Excise directives 
Harmonized target level of excise duties was in 1987 ECU 0.177 per litre. Minimum 
levels of excise duties were raised to ECU 0.195 in 1989 and to ECU 0.245 in 1991. 
 
 
